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Taxes and Women in the Labour Force in a
Southern European Country: The Case of
Portugal
Ana Cristina Lino Marques ± Pedro Telhado Pereira
Abstract. On looking at the female labour supply in Europe, it is immediately
noticed that there is a large variation among countries. One possible explanation
for this fact is that different countries have different tax policies, leading to
variations in incentive and costs. This has been investigated in papers such as
that of Gustafsson (1992a,b) for countries such as Germany and Sweden. The
same exercise has been performed by the present authors for a low-income,
southern European country, Portugal, which has one of the highest rates of
female participation (out of line with neighbouring countries). Female labour
supply does not seem to be very sensitive to fiscal policies, as those policies have
only a small influence on the take-home wage. This result appears to be
independent of the fact that the female labour supply shows a higher elasticity to
wages than that which has been reported for other countries. The present authors
also show that Portuguese women contribute a much larger proportion of family
earnings than do their counterparts in Sweden and Germany, and that the
Portuguese fiscal system is rather neutral. Further studies with data from
other countries are needed in order to shed more light on the issue of tax
harmonization.
1. Introduction
Portugal has a rather peculiar female labour market supply. In
1996, the country showed a high female activity rate1 (49.3
percent), much higher than that which is found in the other
southern European countries (namely, 36.2 percent for Spain, 34.6
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percent for Italy and 36.6 percent for Greece). Still, it retains some
of these other countries' characteristics, such as a low incidence of
part-time work (13 percent in 1996), a high concentration in the
primary sector (13.5 percent in 1996) and low concentration in the
tertiary sector (64.5 percent in 1996). The fact that Portugal differs
from the countries with which it is generally grouped (southern Ð
Mediterranean), invites a search for reasons.
Among the factors contributing to Portugal's elevated participa-
tion of women in the labour force, some researchers (for instance,
Meulders et al., 1991) have pointed to the colonial war, to the high
emigration of prime age males in the 1960s and to the 1974
revolution, and the political, cultural, social and economic changes
which it brought on.
Some studies for the central-northern European countries have
shown that differences in female participation can be explained by
different tax systems (see, for instance, Aaberge et al., 1993; Agell,
Apel, 1991; Bourguignon, Magnac, 1990; Colombino, Del Boca,
1990; Dex, Walters, 1992; Gustafsson, 1988, 1992a,b), an issue of
great interest to the discussion of fiscal harmonization in the
European Union. `Is the Portuguese tax system a strong
contributing factor to the pattern observed in female participation
in the labour market?' This is the question addressed in this paper.
Data were used on earnings and individual characteristics for
2322 married couples in 1990. The main features of Portuguese
income tax and of the fiscal systems implemented (joint taxation
with a splitting factor of 2.0, separate taxation and a flat rate) were
programmed, in order to calculate the after-tax income to be used
in the simulations.
The results show that married women in Portugal have a higher
elasticity of labour supply in terms of take-home pay than in all the
other studies cited above. In terms of the simulations for different
taxation regimes, the changes in labour supply are small when
compared with those for other countries. However, it should be
recalled that Portugal has the lowest per capita income of the
countries considered, and the fiscal systems employed have little
effect on after-tax earnings. It would therefore seem that the tax
system is not a major factor in explaining the Portuguese figures. It
is also shown that the contribution of the wife's earnings to the
household income is the same, before and after taxes; in this sense
the Portuguese fiscal system can be considered as being `neutral'.
The paper is organized in the following way. Firstly, in
Section 2, the tax system in Portugal is introduced. In Section 3
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the data and the variables are described. Next, the econometric
model is specified and the empirical results are analysed. Then, in
Section 5, the results of tax simulations are given and these are
compared with those obtained in the literature, in particular with
those of Gustafsson (1992a,b) for Germany and Sweden. Finally,
in the concluding section, the findings are summarized.
2. The personal income tax system in Portugal
In 1990, the tax unit in Portugal is the family, a case of a joint
taxation system. It could be said that the Portuguese system is half-
way between that of Germany (a splitting taxation system) and
that of Sweden (separate taxation) Ð the countries studied by
Gustafsson (1992a,b). In fact, Portugal has a `mixed' splitting
system Ð the splitting coefficient is 2.0 if the couple is two-earner
and is 1.85 if the couple is one-earner (in 1990).
The Portuguese tax system is also a progressive one and tax is
withheld from payroll earnings at source. For further details see
the Appendix.
3. Data and variables
Data used for the estimation were obtained from the `InqueÂ ritos
do 3 trimestre aos dados do emprego de 1990' of the Instituto
Nacional de EstatõÂ stica, where information is gathered regarding
gender, age, relationship with the head of the household, labour
participation, education, net monthly earnings and hours of work
per week for each individual.
The sample used was built from 6940 families, where the selection
criterion was `married women with employed husbands present'.
From this sample, the present authors selected only those couples
where the wife was between 17 and 59 years of age, for whom
information was available about the relevant variables used in this
study (namely, hours of work per week of the husband and of the
wife, if she works in the labour market, and net monthly wages).
Some observations were deleted because the number of hours of
work per week was inadequate. The total number of observations of
married women in the final sample was 2322.
Some problems appear with the net wages, as the data were
collected in 13 brackets which correspond to 13 levels. We took for
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (n 2322)
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Proportion of women
in the labour market
(LFP)a
0.55168 0.49743 0 1
Proportion of women
working full time å 30
hours per week)
(FTLFP)b
0.48751 0.49995 0 1
Proportion of women
working full time å 35
hours per week)
0.47027 0.49922 0 1
Number of children 1.6223 1.0853 0 11
Number of children
under 3 years old
0.20284 0.44201 0 2
Number of children,
3±6 years old
0.19423 0.42610 0 3
Number of children
over 6 years old
1.2188 1.0938 0 8
Wife's age=10 3.8252 0.94037 1.700 5.900
Wife's age squared=100 15.516 7.4224 2.890 34.810
Wife's education
(years)
7.1589 3.7338 0 18
Wife's experience
(years)
12.479 13.4405 0 52
Wife's experience
squared (years)
336.29199 479.37287 0 2704
Wife's weekly hours 21.07321 20.02497 0 72
Husband's weekly
hours
42.56934 7.69684 5 90
Wife's pre-tax monthly
earnings (1000 PTE)




85.98715 45.62269 16.3480 192.9220
Family after-tax
earnings at HF 0
(10,000 PTE)
110.13889 51.43235 22.8872 226.0541
Notes: a LFP labour force participation.
b FTLFP full-time labour force participation.
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net monthly wage the average point of each bracket was taken, and
for the first (last) bracket it was assumed that the amplitude of this
interval was identical to the next (previous) one.
The gross wage was fundamental to this study. To calculate it, it
was assumed that the net wage stated in the survey:
(1) is net of taxes (for further details see the Appendix);2
(2) is net of Social Security contributions (at a rate of 11 percent
of gross earnings);
(3) includes the meal allowance Ð 350 PTE3 21 days (which is
equal to the Public Administration provision) in the absence of
other information;
(4) includes family allowances, which is equal to 1550 PTE for
each child or 2350 PTE for the third and subsequent child if
the aggregate household income is less than 1.5minimum
annual income provided for all the workers (which in 1990 was
14 35,000 PTE) (Fernandes, Santos, 1990). Note that
Portuguese workers were paid 14 times4 per year and received
a meal allowance for each day of work.
The descriptive statistics of the relevant variables used are shown
in Table 1.
The variable `Wife's potential experience' is calculated using:
AGEÿEDUCÿ 6,
which is the convention found in the labour supply literature, when
primary school starts at age 6, as in the Portuguese case.
The sample distribution of weekly hours of work is presented in
Table 2.
The distribution of hours for women indicates that this sample
accurately reflects the Portuguese case in that there is a low
acceptance of part-time work (8.1 percent). However, the married
female labour force participation rate in the sample (55.2 percent)
is lower than the overall Portuguese rate (61.3 percent in 1990).





å 35 1092 47.03
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The wife's average weekly hours of work were calculated for the
entire sample and for two-earner couples (see Table 3). Estimated
average weekly working hours for Portuguese women in two-
earner couples are substantially higher than those obtained by
Gustafsson (1992a,b) for German and Swedish working women
(30 hours).
4. Empirical results
To predict wives' pre-tax wages, the present authors used the
information available on the wages of the wives who do work.
Table 3. Average weekly hours worked
HF HM
All couples 21.0732 42.5693
Two-earner couples 38.1983 42.0804
Table 4. Wife's wage regressions (Heckman's method)
Regressors














Number of observations 1281
Mean of dependent variable 5.9743
Notes: a ÃMill's ratio, which has been estimated using Heckman's method (running a
probit regression on the probability of having an observed wage).
 Significant at 1 percent level;  significant at 5 percent level.
t-values are shown in parentheses.
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However, working wives are a self-selected group. To correct the
sample selection bias on the wives' pre-tax wage regression,
Heckman's method was used (Heckman, 1980), estimating the
Mill's ratio on the probability of having an observed wage
(Greene, 1990; Gustafsson, 1992a; Maddala, 1983).
Table 4 shows the gross earnings parameter estimates corrected
for selectivity bias.
As can be observed, the coefficient associated with the inverse
Mill's ratio ( Ã) is positive and significant. This means that the
working wives in the sample earned higher market wages than
might be expected from their characteristics. Dex and Walters
(1992) suggest career ambition as a possible explanation for this
phenomenon.
Then, for the married women participation rate to be estimated,
the likelihood function is maximized for the following logit:
P log prob(Y 1)
1ÿ prob(Y 1)
 0  1Wn  2R KK  AA  ;
[1]
where Y assumes the value 1 if the woman participates in the
labour force, and the value 0 if she does not;Wn is the wife's after-
tax pay at 20 or 40 hours for women in the labour market, or the
estimates from the Heckman method for those not in the labour
market; R is the family income other than wife's earnings; K
denotes a vector of variables associated with children's age and
number; while A is a vector of variables attached to the wife's age.






A few words about Wn are in order. To overcome the problems
of non-linearity of the budget constraint due to progressive taxes,
some specified points of the budget constraint were investigated
(for more details see Brownstone et al., 1988; Gustafsson, 1992a).
In so doing, the wife's after-tax pay becomes exogenous to the
wife's labour supply decision.
The net wage at 20 and 40 hours was calculated, using the 20
hour net wage to explain the probability of working in the labour
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market and the 40-hour net wage to explain the probability of
working full time.
The choice of these two points was based upon the analysis of
married women's average weekly hours of work for the entire
sample (see Table 2). The wife's after-tax pay, Wn, is therefore












Number of ÿ0.105008 ÿ0.025972 ÿ0.197019 ÿ0.049224
children (ÿ1.593) (ÿ4.271)
Wife's age=10 0.404722 0.1001 1.11919 0.279623
(0.722) (2.819)
Wife's age ÿ0.094987 ÿ0.023493 ÿ0.190998 ÿ0.04772
squared=100 (ÿ1.314) (ÿ3.758)
Family after-tax ÿ0.013255 ÿ0.003278 ÿ0.000762497 ÿ0.000191
























Notes: a LFP labour force participation.
b FTLFP full-time labour force participation.
 Significant at 1 percent level;  significant at 5 percent level; significant at 10
percent level.
t-values are shown in parentheses.
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calculated assuming that the wife works 20 hours per week (for the
probability of participation in the labour market) or 40 hours per
week (for the probability of full-time work). This produces an
average annual wage, Wn, which is then used for the subsequent
calculations.
Table 5 shows the logit estimates and reaction coefficients5
(Hartog, Theeuwes, 1985) of the labour force participation
function for Portuguese married women. All of the coefficients
have the expected sign.
Table 5 shows that the probability of working in the labour
market is negatively influenced by the number of children and by
the family income, and that it increases along with the wife's
annual average after-tax income. The marginal effect of age
presents the usual inverse U shape: it is positive up to 23 years and
negative thereafter, suggesting that Portuguese married women
follow the traditional behaviour pattern of labour market activity.
For full-time participation in the labour market, all the estimates
are significantly different from zero and they are of greater
magnitude in absolute value when compared with the participation
coefficients.
Table 6 shows participation elasticities. The denominated mean
sample participation elasticities are computed as (Dagsvik et al.,
1988; Ofer, Vinokur, 1985):
Ã  (1ÿ prob(Y 1))  HX, [3]
where Ã is the log-odds coefficient estimate associated with the
independent variable X; HX is the mean value of X; and Y is the
dichotomous dependent variable.
Table 6. Mean sample and aggregate participation elasticities
Elasticities HF 20 HF 40
Mean sample
Annual after-tax wage 3.4846761 0.374961
After-tax household income ÿ0.654498 ÿ0.043039
Aggregate
Annual after-tax wage 3.4849565 0.278237
(3.05192) (0.13008)
After-tax household income ÿ0.66291 ÿ0.041804
(0.57379) (0.02284)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 7. Participation elasticities of married women in the labour market
(logit estimates)
Elasticities Wife's wage Income
Mean sample
Participation elasticities
Dagsvik et al. (1988) 1.41 ÿ0.30
Gustafsson (1992a)a
German sample 0.4026 ÿ0.3427
Swedish sample 0.4567 ÿ0.2353
Riboud (1985) 1.15 ÿ0.29
Ofer and Vinokur (1985) 0.49 ÿ0.059
(without taxes)
Dex and Walters (1992)b
French sample 2.70 Ð
British sample 0.63 Ð
Our results 3.485 ÿ0.654
Full-time participation elasticities
Gustafsson (1992a)a
German sample ÿ0.059 ÿ0.809
Swedish sample 0.366 ÿ0.340
Our Results 0.375 ÿ0.043
Aggregate
Participation elasticities
Dagsvik et al. (1988) 1.14 Ð
Gustafsson (1992a)a
German sample 0.383 ÿ0.384
(0.174) (0.269)
Swedish sample 0.394 ÿ0.258
(0.175) (0.179)
Our results 3.485 ÿ0.663
(3.051) (0.574)
Full-time participation elasticities
Gustafsson (1992a)a ÿ0.209 ÿ0.796
German sample (ÿ1.17) (0.439)
0.366 ÿ0.363
Swedish sample (0.083) (0.170)
0.278 ÿ0.041
Our results (0.130) (0.023)
Notes: a These computations were performed with the estimates and average sample values
presented in these papers.
bOnly married mothers.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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The aggregate participation elasticities are derived from a 1
percent increase in X for each individual in the sample. Following
this, the average for the entire sample was calculated.
As such a wide range of results can be found in the literature, a
comparison has been made with studies similar to the present one.
As can be seen in Table 7, the participation elasticities
concerning annual after-tax wage are much higher than those
obtained in analogous studies, with the exception of that of Dex
and Walters (1992), for married mothers in France. Since this
cannot be explained by the methodology, the present authors
attribute it to the low acceptance of part-time work. Dex and
Walters (1992) suggest lower work-related costs as a possible
explanation (namely the cost of child care and the longer hours of
operation for shops and banks), a situation which applies to
Portugal as well.
However, income taxation is another possible underlying reason
for these values. In Portugal, in 1990, the income tax system
penalized the one-earner couples (couples where only one of the
spouses earns more than 95 percent of the total labour income,
generally the husband) (see the Appendix).
The authors should also stress the similarity of the full-time
participation elasticities with respect to the wife's wage in the
present sample with the Swedish sample of Gustafsson (1992a).
5. Simulations of some fiscal reforms
The aim is to test the sensitivity of Portuguese women's labour
supply to tax changes, namely:
(a) joint income taxation with a splitting coefficient of 2.0;
(b) the same, but with the same tax credit for the couple,
regardless of being a one- or two-earner couple;
(c) separate taxation for husband and wife;
(d) separate taxation with the same tax revenue as the 1990
Portuguese system;6
(e) a flat rate only (a variant of ILUR Ð `Imposto Linear UÂ nico
sobre o Rendimento' (Gaspar, 1989; Macedo et al., 1989a,b)
which gives the same tax revenue as the 1990 Portuguese case
(for further details, see the Appendix).
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Table 8. Participation rates (%), after-tax income, taxes and wife's after-tax annual wage (1000 PTE) under different income







































1990 income tax 55.168 48.751 1101.389 1460.842 1769.043 102.431 125.717 200.256 17.973 16.691
Splitting (DED 34,46) 53.06 48.44 1114.023 1461.428 1769.116 89.797 125.132 200.183 17.370 16.377





53.92 49.06 1060.578 1421.450 1739.208 143.242 165.109 230.091 18.043 16.959
Equal to 1990 income
taxa
53.51 49.31 a 1472.305 1791.238 a 114.254 178.060 18.391 17.440
ILUR (a version) 56.14 48.66 1101.389 1460.843 1769.043 102.431 125.717 200.256 17.973 16.691
Notes: a The methodology used for separate taxation with tax revenue equal to 1990 revenue tax gives rise to two different `after-income of husband', as the










































The impact of these systems on the wife's labour force





where PÃi Ã0 Ã1Wni  Ã2Ri K ÃkA ÃA; Wni and Ri are the
wife's annual wage and the household income according to these
tax systems; and Ãi are the logit parameter estimates of Table 5.
Table 8 shows the results of these fiscal simulations.
As revealed in this table, the choice of tax system makes little
difference on married women's labour force participation. One
possible explanation is the slight effect that these systems have on
the wife's after-tax annual earnings. Nevertheless, the results are in
agreement with theory for participation in full-time work. That is,
a shift towards separate taxation will increase the wife's labour
force participation in full-time work and a shift towards splitting
taxation decreases it. A shift towards a flat rate has almost no
effect on this participation, which can be explained by the income
distribution of this system with higher effects on the lower income
couples. All of these findings are valid for participation in the
labour market, with the exception of the simulations for separate
taxation. In fact, with these systems, more women will refrain from
participating in the labour market than under the actual tax
system. Note that after the change, 2294 women maintained their
working status (99 percent of the sample) while 28 women left the
labour market, owing to a decrease in their wages that outweighed
the effect of the decrease in the family income.
These results may be explained by:
Ð the unfavourable treatment of one-earner couples by the
1990 tax regime and the preferential treatment of two-earner
couples;
Ð the advantages to be found in separate taxation for married
women, usually with incomes lower than those of their
husbands (but only in the case of full-time work in
Portugal);
Ð the small increase in the annual after-tax earnings of the
wife when separate taxation is introduced (on average,
66.54 PTE for 20 hours of work in a year) and the
simultaneous decrease in family after-tax earnings at
HF 0 (on average 40,810.435 PTE), which would explain
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the small decrease in participation in the labour market
with this fiscal system.
However, when these results are compared with those for
Germany and Sweden (see Table 9) the results are quite different
from those of the present study. The present authors believe the
lower married women's wages in the Portuguese sample to be one
of the possible reasons, as well as the explanations regarding the
elasticity values.
Note that the findings of other studies are similar to the present
one, even for the system with tax revenue held constant (Aaberge
et al., 1990; Colombino, Del Boca, 1993).

















France 63.1 67.8a 55.4
Aaberge et al. (1993)b
Italy 40.0 38.0 36.0
Gustafsson (1992a,b)c
Germany 50.3 (27.8) 60.4(S)(38.5)
Sweden 80.2 (45.4) 60.0(C)(30.6)
Colombino and
Del Boca (1990)b
Italy 49.2 46.9 45.4(C)
Our resultsd 55.2 (48.8) 53.9(S)(49.1)
51.4(C)(48.2)
Our resultse 55.2(48.8) 56.1(48.7) 53.5(S)(49.3)
Notes: aWithout tax credits.
b Systems with tax revenue held constant and identical to the tax revenue of the current fiscal
system.
c Participation rates in full-time work in parentheses.
d The C denotes splitting with DED 46 and participation rates in full-time work are in
parentheses.
e Identical to fn. d but representing systems with tax revenue held constant and identical to
the tax revenue of the current fiscal system.
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It is also the purpose of the present study to investigate whether
or not any of these tax systems can be said to be neutral with
respect to the wife's earnings (Gustafsson, 1988, 1992a; Gustafs-
son, Bruyn-Hundt, 1991). A fiscal system is regarded as neutral if it
satisfies the following identity:
WF +HF




where Wi is the hourly tax rate of individual i (iF (female), M
(male); Hi is the corresponding work (expressed in hours); C is
the after-tax two-income earner; and R is the after-tax income of
the one-earner couple; that is, if the contribution of the pre-tax
wife's earnings to the pre-tax family income is equal to the
contribution of the after-tax wife's earnings to the after-tax
family income.
It was found that:
(a) Portuguese women contribute a much larger proportion to
family earnings (before and after taxes) than do German,
Swedish and Dutch wives;
(b) unexpectedly, the presence of small children does not affect
Portuguese wives' contributions to family earnings (as it does
in the other three countries);
(c) the 1990 tax system is quite `neutral' with respect to the wife's
earnings (see definition above);
(d) the 1990 tax system penalizes the one-earner couple. So, with
the unique splitting coefficient of 2.0, regardless of the
deduction structure, fewer wives would participate in the
labour market than they actually do (53.06 percent or 51.04
percent against 55.168 percent with the 1990 income tax
system (see Table 8)). As a result, and on average, the
contribution of the wife's earnings to the after-tax family
income decreased slightly. It should be stressed that the same
is observed in the German data (see Table 10a);
(e) with separate taxation, Portuguese women contribute more to
family income after taxes (see Table 10b). (Gustafsson and
Bruyn-Hundt 1991 obtained similar results in Sweden and also
when they applied the Swedish fiscal system to German and
Dutch couples, because the wife's contribution to family
earnings is greater after taxes than before.)
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6. Concluding remarks
The OECD trends in personal income taxation are fundamen-
tally:
Ð moving towards separate taxation (at least as an option);
Ð replacing taxable income deductions for dependant children
by tax credits or family allowances; and
Ð decreasing high marginal tax rates.
In effect, and in terms of tax unity, it has been argued that joint
taxation increases women's dependency, and thus favours `women
at home'. On the other hand, separate taxation satisfies the
efficiency principle of a fiscal system (which can be translated in
this case as neutrality on the part of both spouses towards the
Table 10a. Women's contribution to family earnings (percent)
Portugal Germany(1) Sweden(1) The Netherlandsa
Before taxes
All 0.234 0.150 0.288 0.119
Two-earner 0.425 0.322 0.376 0.302
With youngest
child aged 0±2
0.262 0.072 0.246 0.066
After taxes
All 0.231 0.124 0.166 0.147b
Two-earner 0.418 0.310 0.407 0.369b
With youngest
child aged 0±2
0.257 0.060 0.082 0.071b
Notes: a Source: Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt (1991).
bDutch system after OORT 1990 tax reform.
Table 10b. Portuguese women's contribution to family earnings








All 0.227 0.224 0.239
Two-earner 0.411 0.407 0.433
With youngest child aged 0±2 0.253 0.251 0.266
Notes: aWith tax revenue different from 1990 income tax.
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decision to participate in the labour market) and the neutrality
with respect to marriage.
Until 1989 the taxation of income in Portugal consisted of
different taxes according to their source (capital, real estate,
industrial and agricultural activity and labour income) and a
general surtax levied on total income. In 1989 a tax reform
replaced the different income taxes with two new tax schedules: a
personal income tax for individuals and a corporate income tax for
legal entities. The household is assessed jointly; however, in the
reform the splitting coefficient varies. It is 2.0 for two-earner
couples and 1.85 for one-earner couples. So, the present authors
have evaluated what the participation rate of Portuguese married
women would have been if there had been only a single coefficient
(equal to 2.0) or if the spouses had been taxed separately.
The empirical results confirm the economic intuition, that is:
Ð Tax changes that affect the take-home income have an
impact on the participation of married women in the labour
force. In fact, an increase in a wife's annual after-tax wage of
1 percent is estimated to raise the labour supply by 3.49
percent. This result is substantially greater than that which is
usually found in the literature (0.40 percent (German sample
± Gustafsson, 1992a) and 2.7 percent (French sample ± Dex,
Walters, 1992), just to cite two examples). Also, an increase
in a wife's annual after-tax wage of 1 percent is estimated to
increase full-time participation by 0.38 percent (mean
sample elasticity) or by 0.28 percent (aggregate elasticity),
while in the other studies referred to the corresponding mean
sample elasticities have values from ÿ0.059 percent to 0.366
percent. An increase of 1 percent in the after-tax household
income is estimated to decrease labour force participation by
0.65 percent (mean sample elasticity) or by 0.66 percent
(aggregate elasticity) and to decrease full-time labour force
participation by around 0.04 percent.
Ð Separate taxation increases the participation in the full-time
labour force from 48.75 percent to 49.06 percent or to 49.31
percent, respectively, when the tax revenue is not held
constant or is held constant and equal to the 1990 tax
revenue. In Gustafsson's study, separate taxation gives rise
to a much higher effect on full-time participation among
German wives: from 27.8 to 38.5 percent, which is associated
with the magnitude of the increase in net wage that German
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wives experience and of the decrease in after-tax income of
the families when they do not work.
Ð Separate taxation induces a decrease in the labour force
participation from 55.17 to 53.92 percent (or to 53.51
percent if the tax revenue is held constant and equal to that
of 1990). German wives increase their participation from
50.3 to 60.4 percent when confronted with Swedish taxes.
This difference can be explained by the mean after-tax wage
increase (29.2 percent for the German sample and 0.37
percent for the Portuguese one) and by the mean after-tax
family income decrease when HF 0 (27 and 3.7 percent,
respectively, for German and Portuguese samples).
Ð The quasi-splitting tax system (existing in Portugal) induces
a greater participation of women in the labour market than
does the absolute splitting system (since it is unfavourable to
one-earner couples), which reduces the labour force
participation to values estimated between 53.06 and 51.4
percent, depending upon the specific hypotheses regarding
the deductions structure.
Nevertheless, fiscal policy is only one of the factors that
influence the female labour supply. Among others, subsidized
child care and parental leave can be mentioned. Therefore, future
research is needed in order to consider these factors and to
contemplate the joint decision which the household makes
regarding working and having children.
Appendix
1. Personal income taxes in Portugal in 1990
The main features of the Portuguese personal income tax in 1990
used in the computation of after-tax family income were:
(i) the tax unit is the family, so the earnings of the dependant
children are assessable with those of the parents. However,
the sample constructed by Sentieiro (1992), presents no
available information in this regard. Consequently, the
household income is set equal to the earnings of the couple;
(ii) the tax base in this sample consists of the annual family
income;
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(iii) the annual taxable family income is calculated as the annual
gross family income after the following deductions:
Ð sixty-five percent of the gross earnings up to 300,000
PTE or the total social security payments, if greater
than 300,000 PTE (DeducË oÄes EspecõÂficas, personal
deductions);
Ð a non-standard tax relief (for instance, for depen-
dants' education, certain insurance premiums, interest
on housing loans, etc.) of 105,000 PTE for a married
couple if greater expenses are not documented (which
is the case in this sample);
(iv) the tax schedule for 1990 is shown in Table A1.
(v) the income tax liability is computed for each bracket as
follows:
tax taxable incomemarginal tax rate
ÿ amount to deductÿ tax credit;
(vi) for married couples the income tax liability is calculated as:
Pincm ÿDRm  Pincf ÿDRf ÿ 105;000
2
 tÿ PA
0@ 1A 2ÿ TC;
for two-earner couples, where Pincm is the gross annual
income of the husband; Pincf is the gross annual income of
the wife; DRm is personal deductions (DeducË oÄes EspecõÂficas)
for the husband; DRf is personal deductions (DeducË oÄes
EspecõÂficas) for the wife; t is the marginal tax rate; PA is the
amount to deduct, corresponding to the bracket of income;
and TC are the tax credits of 46,000 PTE for the married
couple and of 12,000 PTE for each dependant.
Table A1
Taxable annual income
(1000 PTE) Marginal tax rate (%)
Amount to deduct
(1000 PTE)
Up to 540 16 0.0
540 to 1020 20 21.6
1020 to 1500 27.5 98.1
1500 to 3600 35 210.6
Over 3600 40 390.6
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For one-earner couples:
Pincm ÿDRm ÿ 105;000
1:85
 tÿ PA
0@ 1A 2ÿ TC;
where the tax credit is now 34,000 PTE for the married
couple and 12,000 PTE for each dependant.
2. Fiscal systems implemented in this study
2.1 Joint taxation with splitting method. For this case it is
considered that the splitting coefficient is 2.0 for all the married
couples. But the tax credits are those indicated for the one- and
two-earner couples in the Portuguese income tax (the authors
maintain the tax schedule and the deductions for taxable income
calculation).
2.2 Joint taxation with splitting method (DED 46). For this
system, the splitting coefficient is considered to be 2.0 (whether a
one- or two-earner couple) and that the tax credits are those of the
two-earner couple. All of the remaining features described in
Section 1 of this Appendix are held constant.
2.3 Separate taxation. In this system it is assumed that the tax
unit is the individual and that the deductions and tax schedule are
the same as Portugal's. However, the non-standard tax relief is
now the same as for unmarried individuals: 52,500 PTE and the tax
credits are 23,000 PTE for each taxpayer and 6000 PTE for each
dependant child.
The after-tax household income is now the sum of the after-tax
income of each spouse.
2.4 Separate taxation calculated as 1990 tax revenue. This is the
same as in Section 2.3 above except the marginal tax rates and the
amounts to deduct are adjusted (that is, the average tax rate) so as
to obtain a tax revenue identical to that of 1990. The coefficient of
adjustment for HF 20 is computed as follows:
(1ÿ LFP) + TAX(HF  0) LFP + TAX(HF  20)
(1ÿ LFP) + TAXS(HF  0) LFP + TAXS(HF  20)
;
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where all of the variables are evaluated at the mean and TAX(.)
denotes the 1990 tax revenue when the wife works; HF is hours in
the labour market; and TAXS(.) is the tax revenue when separate
taxation is implemented. The same procedure is adopted for full-
time participation in the market.
2.5 Flat rate (ILUR). This is a variant of a proposal of Macedo
et al. (1989a,b) (Gaspar, 1989) known as ILUR (Imposto Linear
UÂnico sobre o Rndimento), by which there will be only a flat rate. In
this paper the present authors consider a variant of that system,
but with tax revenue equal to that of the Portuguese income
taxation of 1990. For that, a tax function is estimated by OLS,
where the dependent variable is the tax revenue when the wife
works a specified number of hours (0, 20 or 40) and the exogenous
variable is the gross household income for the same wife's work
hours. The tax regressions are shown in Table A2.
Notes
1 Eurostat (1996), `EnqueÃ te sur les forces de travail Ð ReÂ sultats 1996'.
2Data are available upon request from the authors.
Table A2. Tax regressions
Tax revenue when:
Regressors HF 0 HF 20 HF 40
Constant ÿ132.9492 ÿ187.8526 ÿ280.2533
(ÿ133.322) (ÿ103.791) (ÿ115.270)
Gross household income 0.1955279 0.197641 0.2440003
(267.195) (198.832) (234.132)
Adjusted R2 0.9685 0.9445 0.9594
F 71,392.98 39,534.06 54,817.72
Notes: In these regressions, the constant denotes the tax credit and the income coefficient,
the marginal tax rate.
For the other fiscal reforms with tax revenue equal to 1990, the gross earnings of the
wife must be re-computed. This has been done with the use of a FORTRAN
program, which is available on request from the authors.
 Significant at 1 percent level
t-ratios are shown in parentheses.
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3 Even though Euros did not exist in 1990 the conversion is included in order to
aid the reader: 1 Euro 200 PTE.
4 Twelve months of regular salary plus a one month salary bonus in July and
another in December.
5 The reaction coefficients give the marginal effect of any independent variable
on the probability of having LFP 1 or LFP 0 (or FTLFP 1 or FTLFP 0)
for any observation. For the probability of labour force participation, they are
calculated as  prob (LFP 1)  (1ÿ prob (LFP 1)), evaluated at the mean of
prob (LFP 1) (Greene, 1990; Maddala, 1983, 1989; Riboud, 1985).
6No attempt is made to align joint income taxation with the same tax revenue
as the 1990 Portuguese case, since tax revenue under systems (a) and (b) are very
similar to 1990 tax revenue. For further details see the Appendix.
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